The Epistemological Disunity of Memory by Teroni, Fabrice
 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISUNITY OF MEMORY* 
Fabrice Teroni, University of Bern 
 
The idea that our confidence in memory, which explains many if not most of the 
judgements we make, is systematically misplaced constitutes one of the most 
extreme and counterintuitive forms of scepticism. Intuitively, it seems obvious 
that memory judgements can be and typically are justified and this intuition has 
been happily endorsed by the vast majority of philosophers interested in the 
epistemology of memory. Yet, consensus ends here and the question as to what 
justifies memory judgements has generated a long-standing debate between two 
approaches. On the one hand, the ‘Past Reason Theory’ (e.g. Annis 1980, 
Malcolm 1963, Naylor 1985, Senor 1993) has it that memory judgements are 
justified by the reasons one had to make these judgements. What justifies your 
memory judgements are those reasons you had to make them in the first place. On 
the other hand, the ‘Present Reason Theory’ (e.g. Audi 1995, Chisholm 1989, 
Ginet 1975, Pollock 1974) defends the claim that these reasons are to be found at 
the time memory judgements are made. What justifies your memory judgements 
are reasons you have now that you remember. Is it possible to resolve this debate? 
As opposed to previous treatments of this issue, my argument shall be that, far 
from being exclusive, these two approaches are needed to account for the 
justification of different kinds of memory judgements. For that reason, one 
outcome of my discussion is that memory judgements exhibit no epistemological 
unity. I shall proceed as follows. I first introduce the distinction between episodic 
and semantic-propositional memory and explain the epistemological import of 
some influent suggestions as to how we should draw this distinction. Next, in 
section 2, I argue that the Present Reason Theory fails to account for the 
epistemology of propositional memory and suggest that this failure traces back to 
its relying on a distinctive form of internalism. And this, I maintain, supports the 
                                                
* This paper is the descendent of Kevin Mulligan’s suggestion that I might be interested in 
working on memory, but I guess I am the only person still episodically remembering that event. It 
is in any case a modest tribute to what I learnt from him. Happy birthday, Kevin!  
2 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISUNITY OF MEMORY 
Past Reason Theory as an account of propositional memory judgements. Yet, it 
would be wrong to think that this conclusion carries over to the epistemology of 
episodic memory: as I argue in section 3, the Present Reason Theory offers here a 
much more sensible account. Finally, in the fourth section, I suggest a way of 
resolving the debate between Past and Present Reason Theories.   
1 PROPOSITIONAL AND  EPISODIC MEMORY 
It is customary for psychologists (e.g. Tulving 1972 & 1985, Perner 2000, Perner 
& Ruffman 1995) as well as for philosophers (e.g. Dokic 1997, Hoerl 2001, 
Martin 2001) to draw a contrast between propositional-semantic memory and 
episodic memory. The import of this distinction can be measured if we focus for a 
moment on two kinds of memory reports. ‘John remembers that Dreyfus was 
innocent’ and ‘June remembers that Masaccio painted the Cappella Brancacci’ 
are typical reports of propositional memory. In these reports, ‘to remember’ is 
followed by ‘that’ clauses and one of their salient features lies in the fact that they 
extend well beyond events the subject witnessed or objects with which he has 
been acquainted. Reports such as ‘Mary remembers her first meeting with her 
boss’ and ‘Jim remembers an awful accident’ are typical reports of episodic 
memory. In such reports, the verb is not followed by ‘that’ clauses. One salient 
feature of these reports consists in the fact that they are, as opposed to 
propositional memory reports, limited to events the subject has witnessed and 
objects with which he has been acquainted. This is why propositional memory 
reports are not easily turned into episodic memory reports. It would for instance 
be inappropriate to say of June, born in 1980, that she remembers Masaccio 
painting the Cappella Brancacci. 
How should we draw the distinction between propositional and episodic 
memory? Here are three attempts to do so that have proved particularly influent. 
One approach has it that the presence of information about where and when 
something happened is the distinctive mark of episodic memory (Tulving 1972). 
Another approach suggests that what is specific of episodic memory is the 
presence of information about the self (Howe 2000). Finally, some have attempted 
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to draw this distinction by appealing to the complex metarepresentational content 
referring to a past experience that is claimed to be distinctive of episodic memory 
(Dokic 1997, Perner & Ruffman 1995).  
These theses about episodic memory will not be my main focus in what 
follows, but they help pin down two recurrent features of discussions of episodic 
memory that will prove important to disentangle some of the epistemological 
problems that lie ahead of us. First, the distinctiveness of episodic memory is 
claimed to reside in its subject matter – be it a past context, the self or a past 
experience: episodic memory is (typically at least) constituted by a past-tensed 
judgement about the relevant subject matter. Second, these theses implicitly 
assume that propositional and episodic memory are epistemologically on a par. 
This may well be motivated by what I just said. For if episodic memory differs 
from propositional memory only insofar as the relevant judgements have a 
different subject matter, the difference may prove epistemologically 
inconsequential. This assumption can be questioned, however. And, as we shall 
see, investigating the epistemological issues surrounding memory provides some 
reasons to reject it. Let me start by propositional memory. 
2 PROPOSITIONAL MEMORY 
Propositional memory reports – ‘John remembers that Dreyfus was innocent’ –
have a clear epistemic import. We see John as, ceteris paribus, justified to judge 
that Dreyfus was innocent if he so remembers. Yet, in virtue of what are these 
memory judgements justified? I shall start by investigating how this question can 
be answered within the Present Reason Theory, which you will remember is the 
claim that the relevant reasons are to be found at the time memory judgements are 
made. If one subscribes to this theory, three ways of answering this question 
might be pursued: one may appeal to memory impressions, to some sort of 
inference or to the subject’s beliefs about the source of his judgement. Let us see 
how these answers proceed, starting with the most intuitively appealing one. 
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2.1 Memory impressions 
We are all accustomed to the fact that judgements sometimes strike us as, to put it 
loosely, ‘coming from the past’. ‘It just seems to me that I remember that p’, ‘I 
have the impression that I remember that p’ is how we typically express this fact. 
This appears to support a quite appealing idea: when one remembers that p, what 
justifies one in judging is one’s seeming to remember that p. This claim is 
distinctive of what I shall call the Memory Impression Theory or, for short, MIT 
(Pollock 1974, Pollock & Cruz 1999: chap. 2). This theory qualifies as an instance 
of the Present Reason Theory, since the memory impressions that justify memory 
judgements take place at the time these judgements are made.  
Now, what exactly are these ‘impressions’ or ‘seemings’? They should not be 
assimilated to judgements about our source for judging that p (Pollock 1974: 191). 
That is, the impression to remember that Dreyfus was innocent does not consist in 
John’s additional judgement e.g. that he learnt this in a serious book, but is a 
distinctive phenomenological state. Let me grant this.1 Next, note that if these 
impressions may be more or less intense, they are difficult to tell apart from one 
another. The seemings of seeming to remember that Dreyfus was innocent and 
seeming to remember that Napoleon crossed the Alps do not differ very much and 
this explains why advocates of MIT suggest that there is one sort of impression 
that simply gets attached to different contents. 
The Memory Impression Theory offers an intuitively appealing account of 
justified propositional memory judgements, but it faces some significant 
difficulties. Let me start by observing that these memory impressions are often 
quite elusive. They do not accompany, for instance, many of our judgements 
about historical events. This is not in itself a problem for MIT, which can claim 
that these judgements are for that very reason unjustified. The problem is rather 
that the boundary between what is and what is not accompanied by these 
impressions hardly corresponds to the one we intuitively draw between justified 
and unjustified memory judgements. One the one hand, it would be preposterous 
                                                
1 If you disagree, this means that MIT does not constitute an alternative to the Source Monitoring 
Theory I discuss below. 
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to assess John’s judgement that Dreyfus was innocent as unjustified simply 
because it is not accompanied by a memory impression. And, on the other hand, 
the presence of such an impression does not dispose us to think favourably of 
Max’s judgement that aliens have landed in his backyard. Yet, Pollock argues that 
MIT has one advantage that might offset these serious misgivings: 
The recollection adds something to the belief. My having the recollection tags the 
source of the belief as being memory rather than present calculation or the result of 
reading the value off a table presently before me or simply pulling the number out 
of the air at random. (Pollock 1974: 189) 
The argument is that memory impressions are needed in order for the subject to 
distinguish memory from other sources of belief or judgement. And it is true that, 
when trying to remember whether p, we sometimes eventually get a memory 
impression. Still, most propositional memory judgements arise spontaneously in 
answers to questions and are not prefaced by such tryings. And in these cases, no 
distinctive phenomenal impression is to be found: one spontaneously passes the 
judgement without being aware of a present source for making it. This is enough 
to be able to ‘tag the source of the belief as being memory’. Distinguishing in 
propositional memory a memory impression that p and the judgement that p often 
does not correspond to any phenomenally salient fact (Locke 1971: 38, Naylor 
1985). 
We can now make use of these observations to build a dilemma. Either MIT 
persists in requiring memory impressions for justification, or it is modified so as 
to appeal to no more than the spontaneity of propositional memory judgements. 
The first horn is not attractive: it has, as we have seen, serious revisionist 
consequences regarding our intuitive grasp of the distinction between justified and 
unjustified memory judgements. The second horn is no more attractive. For the 
spontaneity of a judgement does not contribute in any way to its justification: 
Max’s judgement that aliens have landed in his backyard remains unjustified 
despite its being spontaneously passed. The fact that many propositional memory 
judgements are made spontaneously does not help explain why they are justified. 
But MIT, appealing in the way it does to the circumstances surrounding the 
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memory judgement, cannot but remain silent on what may account for the 
epistemological difference between two equally spontaneous judgements (see also 
Annis 1980: 325-326).  
Despite its initial attraction, then, an appeal to memory impressions fails to 
uncover necessary or sufficient conditions for the justification of propositional 
memory judgements.2 Of course, MIT’s dismissal does not signal the end of the 
Present Tense Theory, which comes in many different flavours. But if not 
memory impressions, then what sort of reason must we have at the time we 
remember in order for our propositional memory judgements to be justified? 
2.2 Virtual inferences  
The second approach to propositional memory judgements suggests we answer 
this question by mentioning our capacity to back up these judgements by 
appealing to the evidence at our disposal. And it is definitively true that we are 
often able to back up these judgements in this way. To illustrate, let me come 
back to John. John, we may suppose, does not only remember that Dreyfus was 
innocent, but also that he just heard a serious historian telling so, and that he saw a 
BBC documentary arguing for this claim. This being the case, he is in a position 
to argue that the evidence at his disposal is best explained by the truth of his 
judgement. We can imagine him as arguing along the following lines: if Dreyfus 
had been guilty, then serious historians and BBC documentary makers would 
surely not be mistaken about it.  
These observations may now be used to build an alternative epistemology of 
propositional memory judgements. Thus, Peacocke suggests that:  
A belief held without reasons is knowledge only if a sound, and in the 
circumstances knowledge-yielding, inference to the best explanation could be made 
from the evidence available to the believer to the truth of his belief. (1986: 163-
164) 
Let me adapt this claim so as to make it apply to propositional memory 
judgements: the idea then becomes that these judgements are justified if a justified 
inference to the best explanation is at the believer’s disposal. This inference being 
                                                
2 Senor (1993) and Owens (1999) offer further criticisms of MIT.  
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at the subject’s disposal at the time he remembers, this explains why this Virtual 
Inference Theory (VIT) is, like the Memory Impression Theory, an instance of the 
Present Reason Theory.  
In the light of the above observations about memory impressions, this approach 
has a lot to be said in its favour. Let me simply emphasize two important points. 
First, our attention is now drawn away from phenomenological issues and to the 
evidence at the subject’s disposal, something which appears to carry more 
epistemological weight. Second, the spontaneous character of many propositional 
memory judgements is easily accounted for: VIT appeals to what is at the 
subject’s disposal and does not require that he actually goes through a 
sophisticated inference. 
Yet, this last observation already contains the germ of a first difficulty faced by 
this approach. It is customary to distinguish between justifiable and justified 
judgements, i.e. between judgements we merely have reasons to make and 
judgements we make for these reasons. VIT is at pains to admit the existence of 
such a distinction for propositional memory judgements. Its appeal to the 
availability of an inference to the best explanation readily accounts for justifiable 
propositional memory judgements, but what about those that are in addition 
justified? Now, it is correct to point out that we should be ready to count among a 
subject’s justified beliefs the obvious, though not drawn, consequences of what he 
justifiably believes. However, we cannot avail ourselves of this idea to extend 
VIT so as to account for justified memory judgements: the inferences it appeals to 
are complex and far from being obvious. This means that VIT must claim that 
propositional memory judgements are justified only if one makes the inference: 
taking a reflective stance on doxastic states and their relations is required for 
justification. This gives rise to two difficulties.  
First, the capacities that taking such a reflective stance presuppose have been 
quite consistently shown to be fully in place only around the age of 5 (e.g. Perner 
& Ruffman 1995). VIT thus unappealingly implies that no justified propositional 
memory judgement is possible before this age. The second difficulty has to do 
with the fact that we rarely indulge in the sort of inference around which this 
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approach is built. Our reliance on memory is not shot through with inferences of 
this nature, which are made, or so it seems to me, almost exclusively when we 
nourish doubts about our beliefs. And it is not only questionable to try to build, 
for no obvious reason, the epistemology of propositional memory on 
psychological assumptions that are so rarely satisfied, one also cannot in this way 
account for all those judgements we intuitively assess as justified despite their 
being obviously not based on inferences. 
Let me finally focus on another problem faced by the approach under 
discussion, a problem which centres on those quite common cases of propositional 
memory in which one has lost track of one’s unique evidence for the relevant 
judgement. In these cases, there is not much by way of available inference. 
Suppose for instance that John once read that Dreyfus was innocent in a serious 
book and completely forgot this. Which inference can he then perform? To put it a 
bit oddly, the only evidence at his disposal is constituted by his belief. And even if 
we may try to apply VIT by suggesting that John’s judging that his belief is best 
explained by its truth qualifies as an inference of the relevant type, this appears to 
be a constitutive feature of firmly held beliefs. This means that John is, according 
to VIT, on a par as regards justification with Mark, who I shall suppose acquired 
the same belief for fanciful reasons. But, surely, John differs from Mark with 
respect to justification. VIT is, we now realize, similar to MIT as regards the way 
it distorts our intuitive grasp of the domain. And it distorts it for the same reason, 
namely because it exclusively focuses on what happens at the time John and Mark 
make their respective memory judgements, a time at which nothing tell them 
apart.3 
All in all, then, the Virtual Inference Theory does not prove more convincing 
than an appeal to memory impressions. At this stage, it seems to me that there is 
but one interesting option left for trying to account for propositional memory 
judgements within the boundaries fixed by the Present Reason Theory. 
 
                                                
3 Note in passing that VIT also appears to imply that forgetting a bad source of information while 
preserving a belief enhances its justification. 
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2.3 Source-monitoring 
The key thought behind this third approach is constituted by the observation that, 
when we make propositional memory judgements, we are often able to back up 
our claims by reference to a source of information. John may for instance judge 
that he learnt that Dreyfus was innocent by reading a serious book: from his 
perspective, this is why he is now in a position to judge that Dreyfus was 
innocent. The distinctive claim of the Source-Monitoring Theory (SMT) is that 
propositional memory judgements are justified by further judgements of this 
nature. This is a third instance of the Present Reason Theory, because these 
source-monitoring judgements happen when memory judgements are passed. Yet, 
it differs from the Memory Impression Theory insofar as it does not rely on 
memory impressions, and from the Virtual Inference Theory because no reference 
is made to complex inferences. It is nevertheless at least as problematic as these 
other forms of the Present Reason Theory. 
The first problem is that SMT is, as VIT, cognitively quite demanding, since 
justification depends on the deployment of source-monitoring capacities. For that 
reason, it does not allow us to draw a distinction between justified and unjustified 
propositional memory judgements for unsophisticated subjects. Insofar as we 
think that such a distinction can and should be made, SMT is a non-starter.  
The second problem also echoes one we have seen is faced by VIT. SMT relies 
on quite questionable psychological assumptions and as a result has some dire 
epistemological consequences. For note that we often do not preserve the source 
of our propositional memory judgements and that, when we are able to cite one, 
this is often rather due to reconstruction than to preservation. So, if SMT requires 
that the source be preserved, then it implies that many propositional memory 
judgements lack justification – such is the case for John’s judgement, for instance, 
if he did not preserve its source and even though it manifests a belief based on the 
reading of a serious book. As a result, a large bulk of these judgements is left in 
the sceptic’s hands. And SMT cannot appeal to reconstruction as such. Not only is 
it unclear how the latter could justify a judgement – think of all those cases in 
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which odd confabulations are mentioned to back up a belief –, this would also 
turn SMT into a form of the Virtual Inference Theory that we have already seen 
reasons to reject.  
Finally, these last observations create what I tend to perceive as the most 
serious problem for SMT, namely the fact that it moves around the 
epistemological issue without resolving it. This is so because it remains silent on 
the epistemological status of source-monitoring judgements or beliefs. If a 
judgement about the source, such as John’s judgement that he heard a reliable 
historian tell him that p, justifies the memory judgement that p, then this 
justificatory power surely traces back to its own epistemological credentials: the 
judgement about the source has to be justified for it to transmit justification to the 
judgement that p. And if this judgement is itself a propositional memory 
judgement – it has to be if it manifests preservation of information about the 
source rather than reconstruction –, this is exactly the problem we try to resolve 
and about which SMT remains silent. We need to discriminate justified from 
unjustified source-monitoring judgements, but SMT is not up to the task. 
2.4 A diagnosis 
We have seen that the Present Reason Theory is, at least in the forms that have 
been discussed, at pains to account for the justification of propositional memory 
judgements. It is now time to draw a general lesson from our discussion so far. 
You will remember that the three theories presented above qualify as Present 
Reason Theories because they respectively appeal to memory impressions, beliefs 
on which an inference to the best explanation can be or is drawn and source-
monitoring judgements to which the subject has access when he makes the 
propositional memory judgement. Whatever confers justification on memory 
judgements is to be found in the circumstances surrounding the making of these 
judgements. This core assumption may be described as a form of ‘present-tense 
internalism’, since it combines two claims. First, that what confers justification is 
subject to an accessibility requirement and, second, that this requirement is 
satisfied when the memory judgement is made. 
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Present-tense internalism about propositional memory is the source of many of 
the problems we considered. Adherence to this thesis explains why the Memory 
Impression Theory detaches the justification of propositional memory judgements 
from the reasons one had to judge and concentrates exclusively on present 
impressions. It also explains why the Virtual Inference Theory is bound to claim 
that, insofar as two subjects are in a given predicament with respect to the 
inferences they can or do now make, they are equally justified. Finally, it 
constitutes the reason why the Source Monitoring Theory cannot tell apart 
justified from unjustified source-monitoring judgements. In each case, an 
exclusive focus on what is accessible to the subject when he remembers engenders 
serious problems because the epistemological relevance of what happened goes 
unnoticed.  
If this diagnosis is along the right tracks, then it creates in my opinion a strong 
case against the Present Reason Theory and in favour of the Past Reason Theory, 
which differs from it in directing our attention to what happened before 
propositional memory judgements are passed. It is to this theory that I now turn. 
2.5 The Past Reason Theory 
The Past Reason Theory can be fruitfully approached by coming back to the 
function of what I have called, in section 1, propositional memory reports. We 
should observe that these reports do not simply attribute knowledge preservation.4 
They rather appear to be sensitive to a complex pattern exemplified by reasons for 
the relevant judgement. To pin down this pattern, let me distinguish two times of 
epistemic evaluation: the time at which one remembers and the time from which 
one remembers. Propositional memory reports seem to be correctly used when a 
belief has been acquired for a reason satisfying the following requirement: the 
reason must be apt to justify the belief at the time it was acquired as well as at the 
                                                
4 As opposed to a classical analysis defended in Landesman (1962), Malcolm (1963), Munsat 
(1967) and Zemach (1968). 
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time of evaluation, i.e. the time at which the ‘remember that’ report is used.5 That 
is: 
 Belief Justification Constraint on justification 
Time from which one 
remembers (t1) 
Yes Yes A new reason must justify a belief. 
From t1 to te No No In the absence of defeaters, the reason acquired at 
t1 could justify the belief. 
Time of evaluation (te) Yes Yes The reason acquired at t1 must justify the belief at 
te. 
 
Let me call reasons that satisfy this pattern past reasons. These reasons provide 
the starting point we need to move away from the Present Reason Theory. 
Refining the diagnosis presented in the previous section, we can now observe that 
this theory rejects the claim that past reasons justify memory judgements at te. 
This is why they appeal to a justification-conferring feature accessible at that 
time. And, since we have seen plenty of reasons to reject this move, this provides 
a powerful argument in favour of the Past Reason Theory (PastRT). This theory 
straightforwardly translates the pattern exemplified by past reasons in epistemic 
currency: memory beliefs or judgements at te are justified by past reasons.  
This constitutes a radical departure from the Present Reason Theory. The most 
significant aspect of PastRT is indeed constituted by the absence, at te, of an 
access requirement on past reasons that justify the judgement at that time. This 
arguably constitutes its central virtue, since it allows PastRT to draw 
epistemological distinctions that the Present Reason Theory proves unable to 
draw. As we have seen, it is often the case that one has at te past reasons for 
judging without these reasons being accessible at that time. When he passes his 
memory judgement, John may for instance be oblivious to the fact that his reason 
for judging that Dreyfus was innocent is that a reliable historian told him so. Since 
                                                
5 Naylor defends a similar account of propositional memory reports: “B remembers that p from t 
iff (1) there is a set of grounds a subset of which consists of (i) only those grounds B has at both t 
and the present for being sure that p, and (ii) enough such grounds to make it reasonable at both t 
and the present for B to be sure that p, and (2) there is no time prior to t such that B has a set of 
original grounds dating from that time.” (Naylor 1971: 33) 
 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISUNITY OF MEMORY  13 
we quite commonly are in a situation similar to John’s, requiring that justification 
of propositional memory judgements depend on reasons accessible at te would 
leave many of them in the sceptic’s hands. PastRT avoids this kind of scepticism 
in claiming that past reasons are enough.6 This is what allows it, as opposed to the 
Present Reason Theory, to distinguish justified from unjustified judgements 
among those that are accompanied by the same phenomenology and by the same 
possibility of explanatory inference, as well as to distinguish justified from 
unjustified source-monitoring judgements. 
Let me emphasize two further aspects of this approach. First, according to 
PastRT, there must be a sort of dependence between the prior acquisition of a past 
reason and a judgement at te in order for that reason to justify this judgement. 
John’s judgement that Dreyfus was innocent is defeasibly justified at te only if he 
so judges because he acquired a past reason for it at t1. His judgement would not 
be justified if it did depend on bad reasons he acquired in the meantime. That is, 
for his judgement to be justified by the past reason, the following requirement 
must be met: John would not judge that p if he had not been told so by a reliable 
historian at t1 and would judge differently if he was told something else by that 
historian. The justificatory role of past reasons hangs on such dependence. 
Second, this means that PastRT is distinct from the claim that one should stop 
believing when one evaluates one’s reasons as unsound, a claim known as the 
‘principle of positive undermining’ (Harman 1986: 39). PastRT does not endorse 
a ‘default and challenge’ conception of justification (Williams 2001) with regard 
to propositional memory judgements: they are not justified until proven guilty. 
Rather, PastRT discriminates justified from unjustified judgements among those 
for which one has no accessible reason in terms of their dependence on past 
reasons. The application of the principle of positive undermining is as a result 
limited to judgements that satisfy this constraint: only these are justified until 
proven guilty. 
                                                
6 PastRT is of course compatible with the idea that accessible past reasons have an epistemic 
impact. It only denies that this is required for justification at te. For one way to develop this point, 
see the end of section 2.6 below. 
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2.6 Developing the Past Reason Theory 
In the previous section, I introduced the Past Reason Theory as a radical 
alternative to the Present Reason Theory. Since this approach to the justification 
of propositional memory judgements can be developed in various ways, I now 
want to spend some time to explain how I think it should be developed.  
To see what is at stake here, note that PastRT can put different constraints on 
the two times of epistemic evaluation. Thus, according to a first development of 
PastRT, propositional memory judgements that p at te are justified only if 
judgements that p at t1 are themselves justified, i.e. fully exhibiting the pattern 
presented at the beginning of section 2.5 is required. An alternative development 
is advocated by Lackey (2005), who maintains that the judgement occurring at t1 
need not be justified for the propositional memory judgement to be justified, i.e. 
partially exhibiting the pattern is enough for justification at te. Let me call these 
respectively Full and Partial. 
Full: a propositional memory judgement is justified at te if it 
manifests a belief acquired at t1 for a reason in the light of which the 
judgement is justified at t1 and te. 
Partial: a propositional memory judgement is justified at te if it 
manifests a belief acquired at t1 for a reason in the light of which the 
judgement is justified at te. 
I shall now, as a first step in the direction of assessing the respective merits of Full 
and Partial, expand my previous example. Let us suppose that John acquires the 
belief that Dreyfus was innocent at t1 because Mary tells him so, but that his belief 
is not justified because he has bad reasons not to trust her. Let us add that, 
between t1 and te, John forgets the source of his belief and does not acquire any 
new reason in its favour. Finally, suppose that, at te, he judges that Dreyfus was 
innocent because he acquired the belief at t1. Note that Full and Partial differ in 
how they assess John’s memory judgement. According to the former, his 
judgement is not justified at te. But according to the latter, it is justified insofar as 
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John has forgotten his bad reasons to distrust Mary or has in the meantime come 
to believe she is trustworthy.7 
I shall now argue that Full should be preferred. To start, note that Partial goes 
against the following epistemological intuition. It seems that if one judges that p 
because one has judged that p, then the epistemological status of the former 
judgement depends on that of the latter. For instance, even if the relevant defeater 
is later defeated, it seems that John judges for a defeated reason given that his 
judging at te that Dreyfus was innocent depends on having so judged at t1, a time 
at which the reason was defeated. He would judge for an undefeated reason only 
if his judgement were to depend on a prior judgement made at a time when the 
relevant reason was not defeated. I am tempted to think that this favours Full, 
which differs from Partial precisely in its capacity to draw such an intuitive 
contrast. So, let us dig deeper to see whether this intuition is sound. 
To do so, let me explain why Full assesses John’s judgement as unjustified. I 
think that this verdict is motivated by the following observation: given his 
situation, John would judge that Dreyfus was innocent irrespectively of whether 
his reason in favour of judging so is presently defeated or not. It is for that reason 
that Full rejects the strong form of externalism about propositional memory that is 
characteristic of Partial. For note that, according to Partial, what justifies these 
judgements is the reliability of the cognitive mechanism that delivers these 
judgements through preservation of beliefs based on the relevant kinds of reason 
(Lackey 2005). It is for instance because it manifests a reliable cognitive 
mechanism – the memory preservation of beliefs based on what serious informers 
tell us – that John’s judgement is now justified (if not defeated). And the fact that 
                                                
7 Favouring Partial, Lackey (2005) argues that memory can for that reason be a generative 
epistemological source: the judgement is justified because it is a memory judgement. This would 
mean that judgements are justified at te because they manifest beliefs reliably preserved from t1 
and so that preservation in itself positively contributes to justification. Yet, the fact that 
preservation explains why the judgement is made at te does not imply that it plays such a role. We 
should rather say that preservation allows past reasons to (potentially) justify the judgement at te 
by making it the case that this judgement depends on a belief acquired because of the past reason. 
For judgements are not justified simply because they manifest a preserved belief; they rather 
inherit their justification from the past reasons. So, even though Partial were correct, this would 
not support the claim that memory is a generative epistemological source.  
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Partial adopts this form of reliabilism about propositional memory will now allow 
us to build what I perceive as a strong argument against this approach. 
To see how, note that reliabilism faces the task of specifying psychologically 
realistic and reliable cognitive mechanisms. So, which cognitive mechanism is at 
play in John’s case? I think there are two possible answers to this question. One 
may attempt to specify the mechanism either as that consisting in (a) preserving 
unjustified beliefs when what defeated the reasons one had for them is itself 
defeated, or as that consisting in (b) preserving unjustified beliefs if one has no 
reason against them. And this creates a dilemma. 
On the one hand, (a) is surely a reliable mechanism, but it is psychologically 
unrealistic. To be realistic, it would have to require that one has access to the 
relevant reasons in order to be in a position to discriminate actually defeated from 
actually undefeated reasons. Now, to add such a requirement in a defence of 
PastRT would offset one of its main advantages over the Present Reason Theory, 
since this would after all hand in to the sceptic that large bulk of propositional 
memory judgements for which no such discrimination is possible. Yet, in the 
absence of such a requirement, it is fair to say that one would still judge even if 
the reason were in fact defeated. The mechanism being for that reason unreliable, 
the judgements it gives rise to are, by the reliabilists’ own lights, unjustified. 
I think that we should reach the same verdict regarding (b), the mechanism 
consisting in preserving unjustified beliefs insofar as one has no reason against 
them. This mechanism is clearly psychologically realistic, but is of no avail to 
epistemologists of a reliabilist bent. After all, preserving beliefs that were not 
justified in the light of the reasons we had but which are actually not defeated is 
surely not a reliable mechanism of belief preservation.8 
The fact that this dilemma does not affect Full suggests that this way of 
developing PastRT is preferable. And we are now in a position to realize that 
                                                
8 Memory is often said to be epistemologically similar to testimony (e.g. Burge 1997). If so, then 
my argument has the following implication. The fact that one would not share the witness’ reasons 
against his claim is not enough for justification. What is required is that one actually realizes that 
the witness’ defeaters are themselves defeated. Justification transfer is sometimes blocked by 
irrationality (or malice) and to get rid of it requires access to an undefeated reason. 
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Partial faces this dilemma because it dispenses, contrary to Full, with a specific 
internalist constraint on justification. Let me explain. According to Full, the fact 
that a memory judgement made at te depends on an unjustified past judgement for 
which one had a reason that, given how the situation has changed, could justify it 
is not sufficient for that judgement to be justified. Rather, the past judgement 
should also have been justified in the light of the reason: the justification of 
memory judgements requires that one has, at a time, access to a reason in the light 
of which the judgement is justified. Against this, Partial admits that these 
judgements can be justified even if no such time ever occurs, like when the reason 
is accessible but defeated at t1 and undefeated but inaccessible at te.  
This disagreement stems from the different ways Full and Partial conceive the 
basing relation for memory judgements and its connections with the subject’s 
epistemic responsibility and rationality. Full claims that this relation has two 
parts: (a) the subject must have judged because he had access to a reason in the 
light of which his judgement was justified, and (b) his memory judgement must 
depend on his having made the past judgement in this way. Thanks to (a), 
considerations of epistemic responsibility and rationality at the time from which 
one remembers have a bearing on subsequent justification. By contrast, Partial 
turns (a) into: (a’) the subject must have judged because he had access to a reason 
in the light of which his judgement would now be justified ((b) is modified 
accordingly). For that reason, it allocates no role to epistemic responsibility and 
rationality in the justification of memory judgements: these judgements can be 
justified despite the fact that one never judges because one has access to reasons 
in the light of which they are justified.  
Keeping the above dilemma in mind, we can conclude that the basing relation 
for memory judgements must be as Full conceives it to be so as to avoid a form of 
epistemic luck. For a memory judgement to be justified, it must depend on a 
reason that justifies it. This is the case if it depends on one’s having made it at t1 
in the light of an undefeated reason, but not if it depends on one’s having made it 
at t1 it in the light of a defeated reason. For in the latter case, as I already 
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observed, one would still make the judgement if the reason was still defeated. 
This form of epistemic luck is, I think, detrimental to justification. 
Let me bring this discussion to a close with a few words regarding how we 
should develop Full. In my opinion, we should use the requirement that memory 
judgements must be based, at a time, on accessible reasons apt to justify them so 
as to distinguish several cases of propositional memory. In the most 
straightforward cases, this requirement is satisfied at the time the belief is formed. 
In more complex cases, it is not because the reason is at that time defeated. I 
suggest that, in these cases, subsequent justification requires that the reason be 
preserved so that one is able, at a later time, to base one’s judgement on it. If 
John’s reason to believe that Dreyfus was innocent is that Mary told him so at t1, a 
time at which he did not trust her, then he must remember that she told him that 
Dreyfus was innocent at t2, a time at which he trusts her, in order for his 
judgement to be justified by that reason from that time.9 Developed along these 
lines, I think that the Past Reason Theory constitutes an appealing account of 
justified propositional memory judgements. 
3. EPISODIC MEMORY 
The first part of my argument consisted in explaining why the Past Reason Theory 
provides a more appealing epistemology for propositional memory than the 
Present Reason Theory. Does this mean that we should extend this theory so as to 
cover episodic memory as well? The second part of my argument will consist in 
explaining why this is not the case. As we shall see, when we turn our attention to 
episodic memory, the Present Reason Theory becomes almost irresistible. 
3.1 The specificity of episodic memory 
We have seen in section 1 that episodic memory is about specific events in one’s 
past life, and that there exist various attempts to distinguish it from propositional 
memory. As I said there, my aim here is not to assess these theses about episodic 
                                                
9 This means that the Source-Monitoring Theory (see section 2.3) is true in these more complex 
cases. The mistake is to extend it to all cases of propositional memory. 
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memory. Yet, the following observations prove important in the context of the 
present discussion.  
First, and as already emphasized, some influent approaches to episodic 
memory claim that it differs from propositional memory simply in virtue of 
having a distinct subject matter. As a result, they block in my opinion the 
possibility of developing an epistemology specific to episodic memory. Second, 
these approaches to episodic memory are not sufficiently sensitive to the existence 
of a distinctive intentional relation to past events in our life, an intentional relation 
that is quite unlike what happens in propositional memory. Remembering in this 
way events in one’s own past is, as opposed to merely remembering that these 
events happened, to stand in a phenomenologically rich intentional relation to 
these events. It is this form of remembering that tempted so many philosophers to 
try to understand memory in terms of memory images or, more neutrally, of 
memory experiences.  
My interest will be in this distinctive way of remembering. I happen to think 
that we should draw the distinction between propositional and episodic memory 
by means of that which constitutes one’s remembering and so account for the 
specificity of episodic memory in terms of these memory experiences.10 But if you 
disagree, you can regard what follows as an argument for drawing a distinction 
between two sorts of memory in virtue of their different epistemological 
structures. For, independently of the verbal quarrel about what deserves to be 
described as episodic memory, the epistemological distinction on which I shall 
focus is sufficiently important to play a central role in a taxonomy of mnesic 
phenomena.  
This being said, let me now try to answer the following two questions. First, 
what are these experiences that constitute this distinctive kind of memory? 
Second, which epistemological role do these experiences play? 
As regards the first question, one striking fact about memory experiences is 
that they bear a systematic and probably irreducible similarity to perceptual 
                                                
10 Hoerl (2001) and Martin (2001) rightly emphasize the central role of experiences in episodic 
memory. 
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experiences. Consider the following examples. Remembering a melody one once 
heard is phenomenologically similar to hearing it, remembering an accident 
phenomenologically close to seeing it, remembering the taste of a wine 
phenomenologically close to tasting it. These memory experiences, it should be 
emphasized, are quite unlike the memory impressions discussed above in 
connection with propositional memory. Appeal to memory impressions is, as we 
have seen, part of an attempt to describe the distinctive phenomenology of 
propositional memory, of the act of remembering that p and this independently of 
its specific content. The memory experiences we are now discussing do not 
exhibit this content-independence. An experience similar to seeing a particular 
accident is constitutive of episodically remembering that specific accident and 
different memory experience, also exhibiting this similarity with the relevant past 
perceptions, are constitutive of the episodic memory of a melody or of a taste. For 
the purposes of the present discussion, it is enough to add that these experiences 
re-present items that previous experiences presented and thus inherit at least part 
of their intentionality from the intentionality of these previous experiences. 
Let me now turn to the second question regarding the epistemological role of 
these experiences. When we remember by means of these experiences, we 
unquestionably rely on them in making past-tensed judgements and consider them 
as justifying us in so judging. To drive this point home, note that there is an 
important difference between cases where one propositionally remembers that an 
event occurred and cases where one has a memory experience of the event. In the 
second case, one can refer to one’s memory experience in order to back up one’s 
judgement, which is the case when one answers a question as to why one thinks 
that the event happened by saying ‘because I (distinctively) remember it’. 
These observations seem to me to fix a fundamental constraint regarding the 
epistemological role of memory experiences. Any theory that tries to dispense 
with these experiences is deeply revisionist about our practice of making past-
tensed judgements in episodic memory. But what should we more positively say 
about the epistemological role played by these experiences? A straightforward 
answer consists in claiming that these judgements are justified if based on these 
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experiences. And an appealing way of developing this answer consists in 
accepting something like the following principle:  
If a mnesically appears F to S, then S is prima facie justified in 
judging that there was an a which was F if s/he bases her/his 
judgement on this experience.11 
This principle claims that when Jim episodically remembers an accident and 
judges that it was F, what justifies his judgement is the fact it is based on his 
memory experience of this accident. A principle of this nature seems to be needed 
insofar as we want to respect the intuitive role played by memory experiences in 
the justification of past-tensed judgements. And, since we obviously cannot 
extend such a principle to propositional memory, this supports the idea that there 
is a fundamental epistemological difference between episodic and propositional 
memory judgements. Let me elaborate on this point. 
The above principle qualifies as a Present Reason Theory: since the memory 
experiences that justify episodic memory judgements occur at the time these 
judgements are passed, it subscribes to what I called in section 2.4 present-tense 
internalism. This means that the epistemology of episodic memory judgements is, 
according to this principle, quite similar to that of perceptual judgements: in both 
cases, the judgements are justified because they are based on experiences with a 
specific content. 
Before I consider some reasons not to endorse this principle, let me end this 
discussion by stressing four of its features. First, its antecedent does not 
distinguish veridical memory experiences from memory illusions or 
hallucinations. I tend to perceive this as a virtue because I think that, sometimes at 
least, illusory or hallucinatory experiences justify past-tensed judgements. This is 
the case when what appears to one as a memory experience is in fact an 
indistinguishable mnesic hallucination. But if you side with some recent 
developments of disjunctivism in this respect, you can easily modify the principle 
accordingly. Second, the antecedent does not refer to judgements about 
experiences but about the world, for the often-stressed reason that making 
                                                
11 Chisholm (1989: chap. 5) defends a closely related principle.  
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judgements about features of our experiences is not the norm (e.g. Pollock & Cruz 
1999: 25). In this sense at least, mnesic experiences are transparent. Third, the 
consequent states that if the antecedent is satisfied, then judgements are justified 
insofar as (a) they are formed because of the relevant memory experience and (b) 
they attribute to the remembered object a property this experience re-presents it as 
having. Both requirements are needed to distinguish judgements based on 
experiences from judgements that merely co-occur with them. Fourth and finally, 
judgements based on memory experiences are according to this principle prima 
facie justified, i.e. justified provided no defeater is present. 
3.2 Some challenges 
Despite the fact that the Present Reason Theory in the form of the above principle 
offers an intuitively appealing epistemology of episodic memory judgements, the 
truth is that it faces serious challenges. In this section, I shall enquire as to 
whether this principle can take them up. 
Audi nicely expresses the first challenge on which I want to focus in 
suggesting that the Present Reason Theory is wrong-headed because we should 
not 
try to find a rich phenomenal ground for every justified memory belief. That effort 
should be seen as very likely to be motivated by a futile desire to understand 
memorial justification on the model of perceptual justification, for which there is a 
basis quite distinct from the experience of taking in or even carefully considering 
the proposition in question. (1995: 35)12 
We are in a position to agree with a first reading of Audi’s remark, though not 
with a second. If Audi’s aim is to criticize the attempt to model the epistemology 
of propositional memory on that of perception, this is unquestionably correct: we 
have seen that memory impressions are quite elusive and at any rate not sufficient 
to justify these judgements. However, as is revealed by the context surrounding 
the above passage, this is not what Audi has in mind. His claim is rather that it is 
futile to try to find rich (memory experiences) as opposed to poor (memory 
impressions) phenomenal grounds for the justification of memory judgements. 
                                                
12 A similar objection is made in Naylor (1985) and Senor (1993: 456-459).   
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And our conclusions should lead us to view this as an unsatisfying starting point 
for an epistemology of memory. What is fruitless is not the appeal to rich 
phenomenal grounds in connection with episodic memory judgements, but rather 
the appeal to poor phenomenal grounds in connection with propositional memory 
judgements. After all, in the light of the way memory experiences contribute to 
the making of past-tensed judgements, we would misdiagnose the attempt at 
building the epistemology of episodic memory judgements on rich phenomenal 
grounds if we were to view it as revealing a futile desire to model the 
epistemology of memory on that of perception. Yet, can we explain why as 
seasoned an epistemologist as Audi misdiagnoses the situation in such a way? I 
believe the explanation is to be found in the assumption that the epistemology of 
memory is unified. This assumption explains why one may be led to think that, 
since rich phenomenal grounds cannot be appealed to in connection with 
propositional memory, poor phenomenal grounds justify all memory judgements. 
This is precisely the assumption I want to reject and to which I shall come back in 
the final section. But, except for this assumption, Audi gives no reason to think 
that the epistemology of episodic memory is not similar to that of perception. 
The second and third challenges which I want to discuss centre around issues 
having to do with the epistemological dependence of memory. One might first 
wonder, and this constitutes the second challenge, if the claim that the 
epistemology of episodic memory judgements is similar to that of perceptual 
judgements is not doomed from the start since, unlike what happens in perception, 
one already knows what one remembers (Landesman 1962). Now, if this amounts 
to claiming that the judgements we make when episodically remembering have all 
already been made at the time the past experience occurred, it would not 
constitute a good reason to reject the principle. There are after all original episodic 
memory judgements, judgements one passes for the first time when one 
episodically remembers (Martin 1992). More charitably, we may read the 
challenge as claiming that memory should not be conceived as an independent, 
quasi-perceptual access to the past. Such a conception of memory does not 
subtend the principle, however. The similarity with perception is claimed to lie in 
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the fact that different kinds of experiences play the same epistemological role in 
perception and in episodic memory, which does not imply that episodic memory 
constitutes an independent access to the past. 
Still, one might nourish doubts about the principle’s adequacy for a slightly 
different reason that constitutes the third and final challenge. For, even if the 
principle does not rest on the claim that memory is an independent access to the 
past, does it not go against the epistemic dependence of memory? Naylor nicely 
expresses this challenge in the following passage:  
That memory impressions cannot now give me knowledge unless one has had an 
original justification of a sort that could (if one had it now) now give one 
knowledge, is a principle whose denial would mean that our memories could 
sometimes be a source of knowledge in an unwelcome way. (1982: 435, see also 
Annis 1980) 
Remember that we already encountered this problem in connection with 
propositional memory. I argued there that we should not, as opposed to the 
Present Reason Theory, divorce the justification of propositional memory 
judgements from past reasons. Does the principle commit the same mistake in 
failing to respect the epistemic dependence of episodic memory judgements? 
It is true that some of the judgements the principle counts as justified could not 
have been justified in the past. This is the case for judgements based on 
hallucinatory memory experiences. I suggested above that some of these past-
tensed judgements may be justified, and this despite the fact that there are, 
obviously, no past situations in which the corresponding present-tensed judgement 
could have been justified. With regard to these judgements, the principle indeed 
endorses a sort of epistemic independence, which appears to be required if one 
thinks that memory hallucinations can justify. But one may alternatively consider 
this as an argument in favour of restricting the principle to veridical memory 
experiences. Whatever one’s verdict in this respect, I think that the admission of 
this sort of epistemic independence is compatible with the claim that memory is 
epistemologically dependent. For, according to the principle, epistemic 
independence takes place only when, unbeknownst to one, one is not enjoying a 
memory experience. This is to say that epistemic dependence is secured insofar as 
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one is ready to conceive of memory experiences as experiences that re-present 
what the past experiences on which they depend presented. To justifiably judge on 
the basis of a memory experience that the accident was F implies that the 
judgement that it is F was at least prima facie justified at the time of perception. 
And this, we may further observe, constitutes an epistemologically significant 
difference with memory impressions. Appealing to the latter, I argued, implies 
that the justification of memory judgements is independent of one’s past reasons 
in their favour. By contrast, memory experiences depend on “an original 
justification of a sort that could (if one had it now), now give one knowledge.” 
They re-present this original justification and, in a sense, do not provide a new 
one. 
4. RESOLVING THE DEBATE 
Let me conclude. In section 2, we have seen that a specific kind of Past Reason 
Theory is best suited to deal with the justification of propositional memory 
judgements. These judgements are justified by past reasons, and this 
independently of whether these reasons are accessible at the time we remember. 
In section 3, I argued in favour of the Present Reason Theory about episodic 
memory judgements: these judgements are justified by memory experiences that 
take place at the time of remembering. 
This motivates the following resolution of the debate between the Past Reason 
and the Present Reason Theories. This debate is the result of a mistaken attempt at 
extending one of these theories to account for the justification of a kind of 
memory judgement for which it is not suited. On the one hand, the Present Reason 
Theory is correct for episodic memory, but extending it to propositional memory 
judgements leads to the claim that these judgements are justified by what happens 
at the time we remember, for instance by memory impressions. And this creates 
some serious difficulties. First, not only are memory impressions often quite 
elusive, but they are also in serious tension with the epistemic dependence of 
memory and insufficient to account for the justification of propositional memory 
judgements. Second, attempting in this way to unify the justification of 
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propositional and episodic memory judgements typically leads one to favour 
memory impressions over memory experiences, an unappealing move in the light 
of the rich phenomenology of episodic memory. On the other hand, the Past 
Reason Theory is correct for propositional memory, but extending it to episodic 
memory runs afoul of the ways we usually justify episodic memory judgements 
by downplaying the epistemological role of memory experiences. 
Since these problems all derive from the attempt at providing a unified theory 
regarding the justification of memory judgements, my conclusion is that no such 
unity is to be found.13 
                                                
13 My conclusion has some affinities with Burge’s distinction between substantive and purely 
preservative memory (1993, 1997). 
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